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BAILMENT-WORLD'S FAIR-LIABILITY FOR INJURY TO EXHIBITS-
WORLD'S COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION Co. V. REPUBLIC OF FRANCE, 91 Fed.
Rep. 65.-This was an action to recover for loss of goods by fire occurring
two months after the fair had closed. Held, that the fact that the complain-
ant, without recompense, sent a large and valuable exhibit to this country,
by reason of which the public was attracted, resulting in large gains to the
Exposition Co., did not render the latter insurers.
BANKRUPTCY-BANKRUPT PROSECUTING PENDING ACTION OF TORT.-
Held, where, prior to the adjudication a bankrupt had begun an action in a
state court to recover damages for a malicious prosecution and arrest, a
court of bankruptcy has no jurisdiction to control him in the further prose-
cution of such suit, the right of action therein not resting in his trustee;
also, that permission from the court of bankruptcy to prosecute the suit to
judgment was not necessary.
BANKRUPTCY-EXEMPTIONS-LIFE INSURANCE POLICY-IN RE LANGE,
91 Fed. 361.-A policy of insurance on the life of a bankrupt, having a cash
surrender value payable to the bankrupt himself, or to his estate or personal
representatives, passes to and vests in his trustee as assets of the estate in
bankruptcy, subject to the right of the bankrupt to redeem the same by
paying to the trustee its surrender value, notwithstanding that a statute of
the state (Code Iowa, § i8O5) provides that the proceeds of such policies
shall be exempt. from liability for the debts of the assured, and although
section 6 of the bankruptcy act declares that "this act shall not affect the
allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions which are prescribed by the state
laws," for the general language of section 6 is limited and restrained, in
this instance, by the specific provision of section 70, cl. 5, that the bankrupt,
on paying or securing to the trustee the cash surrender value of such a
policy, may "continue to hold, own, and carry such policy free from the
claims of the creditors participating in the distribution of his estate under
the bankruptcy proceedings; otherwise the policy shall pass to the trustee
as assett."
BANKRUPTCY-REFEREEs-DISQUALIFICATION BY INTEREST-BRAY V.
COBB, 91 Fed. IO2.-Under Bankruptcy Act, I898, § 39, providing that
"referees shall not act in cases in which they are directly or indirectly inter-
ested," a referee is not disqualified by interest from acting in a particular
case because he owes a debt to the bankrupt. The interest which will dis-
qualify him is an interest either in the proceedings in bankruptcy or in the
estate of the bankrupt.
BILLS AND NOTES - INDORSEMENT - PAROL EVIDENCE- GOODRICH V.
STANTON, 42 AtI. 74 (Conn.).-A note was made payable to A. S. The payee
indorsed it without recourse, signing the indorsement A. S. Underneath
he signed A. N. S., which was his full name. Held, that parole evidence was
admissible to show whether the payee intended the second signature as an
unqualified indorsement, or whether the whole was intended as a single
qualified indorsement signed both ways.
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CONTRACTS-PARTIES--CONSIDERATIoN-HUSBAND AND WIFE-BU-
CHANAN v. TILDEN, 52 N. E. Rep. 724 (N. Y.).-Plaintiff's husband agreed
with defendant to give his services and raise money to aid in breaking will
of late Samuel J. Tilden, and as compensation plaintiff (who was related,
but not by blood, to the late Mr. Tilden) was to share with the other Tilden
heirs, should the suit be successful. On winning the above suit, and failure of
present defendant to pay the consideration for plaintiff's husband's services.
she brings suit in her own name to recover the same. Held (by a divided
court), that the plaintiff could recover on the above state of facts. Although
plaintiff was a stranger to the consideration, she could recover because her
husband owed her a duty to provide for her future, and also by reason of
her equitable and moral claim as niece by adoption to the late Mr. Tilden.
CONTRACTS-RESCISSION-MIISTAKE-MOFFETT, HODGKINS & CLARKE
CO. v. CITY OF ROCHESTER, 91 Fed. 28.-Complainant, in bidding for a pub-
lic work, made a clerical error, by which he offered to contract at an un-
profitable price. Held, Shipman, J., dissenting, that there could be no rescis-
sion of the contract.
COMMON CARRIERS-TRUCKMEN-ORDINARY CARE-JACKSON ARCHITEC-
TURAL IRON WORKS v. HURLBUT ET AL., 52 N. E. Rep. 665 (N. Y.).-De-
fendants, who advertised themselves as general truckmen, making a specialty
of moving heavy machinery, and who maintained all appliances and necessi-
ties for such business, were held to be common carriers. This, even though
they had no regular tariff of charge, as from the nature of the business it is
necessary to charge different prices in each case, according to amount of
labor required in handling large bulks.
CORPORATIONS-LIBEL BY SERVANT OF TELEGRAPH CO.-EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES-PETERSON V. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO., 77 N. W. 98 5
(Minn.).-Defendant's servant, who had the entire management of defend-
ant's business at one of its offices, sent the plaintiff a libelous message. Held,
that the telegraph company was liable for exemplary damages.
DAMAGES-DYNAMITE EXPLOSION-WRONGFUL ACT-SUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE-PROXIMATE CAuSE-LAIDLAV V. SAGE, 52 N. E. Rep. 679
(N. Y.).-Plaintiff sued to recover for personal injuries alleged to have been
caused by defendant placing plaintiff between himself and a dynamite ex-
plosion. Plaintiff's evidence, which was uncorroborated, was that defend-
ant put his hands on plaintiff and moved him eighteen inches in front of
him, though no force was used in doing it. Plaintiff's memory became weak
after accident. Missiles were found in 'defendant's body which could not
have reached him if plaintiff had been in front of him. Defendant testified
that he did not move plaintiff, and his evidence was corroborated by three wit-
nesses. Held, that as matter of law the evidence was insufficient to sustain
a verdict for the plaintiff. As the explosion was a terrific one, several being
killed, and as defendant was in no way responsible therefor, the court
further held, that evidence of acts of defendant did not sustain burden of
showing that such acts caused substantial injury to plaintiff. The defend-
ant's act was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.
ELECTIONS-BALLOTS AND INSPECTIoN-ToVN CLERK-MANDAMUS-
KEEFE v. DONNELL, 42 AtI. (Me.) 345.-At a state election petitioner's name
was on the official ballots in the town of K as a representative to the Legis-
lature. According to "the result declared and recorded," he failed of an elec-
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tion, but he claimed that if the ballots had been properly sorted and counted,
he would appear to be elected. The ballots used in the election were, as re-
quired by statute, sealed in a package, and returned to the town clerk of K,
who was required by the statute to keep them as a public record for six
months, and not to "abstract from any or in any manner tamper with" said
package, Held, that mandamus will lie to compel the town clerk to open
the package for petitioner's inspection; but that neither petitioner, nor any
one in his behalf, shall be allowed to sort or count or in any way handle or
touch the ballots. The inspection must be in the presence of the town clerk,
who can insist on such restrictions consistent with the right of inspection as
will secure every ballot intact.
INJUNCTIoN-TRADE NAME-SOLE RECEIVING MAIL-DR. DAVID KEN-
NEDY CORP. V. KENNEDY, 55 N. Y. Supp. 917.-One Dr. David Kennedy, a
manufacturer of proprietary medicines, sold to plaintiff the good will of his
business, with the sole right to use the names "Dr. David Kennedy, Rond-
out, N. Y.," and "Dr. D. Kennedy, Rondout, N. Y.," in connection with
such business. Letters so addressed were for some years received by the
corporation of which the Doctor was president. Thereafter he ceased to be
connected with the firm, but continued to reside in Rondout. Held, two
judges dissenting, that he would be enjoined from receiving and opening
mail addressed as above, even though some of the letters in no way con-
cerned the corporation.
INsOLVENCY-BANKRUPTCY LAW-RECEIVER-STATE Ex REL. STROHL V.
SUPERIOR COURT OF KING COUNTY ET AL., 56 Pac. (Wash.) 35.-Held, that
until an insolvent corporation within the state is adjudged a bankrupt under
the Federal Bankruptcy Law of July, 1898, by a proper tribunal, the right of
the state court to appoint a receiver for the corporation under the state law
is not suspended.
JUDGMENTS--FOREIGN JUDGMENTS-VALIDITY-STEWART v. NORTHERN
ASSURANCE Co., 32 S. E. 218 (W. Va.).-A married woman made a contract
which was void under the laws of the state of her domicile. A debtor of
hers was garnisheed by the creditor on the contract in a foreign state, and
after notice by publication judgment was taken by default against her.
The contract was good by the law of the forum. Held, that the judgment
was not conclusive in a suit by the married woman against her debtor in the
state of her domicile. Brannon, P., dissented, on the ground that as by the
laws of the forum the court had jurisdiction, the judgment was final and con-
clusive under the full faith and credit clause. Dent, J., specially concurred
on the ground that the judgment was collusive on the part of the debtor
garnisheed.
MECHANICs' LIENS-PRIORITY OVER MORTGAGE-CUSHWA ET AL. V.
IMPROVEMENT LOAN AND BUILDING ASSOCIATION ET AL., 32 S. E. 259
(W. Va.).-W. Va. Code, p. 652, § 2, provides the "The lieps authorized by
this and the next preceding section shall have priority over any lien created
by deed or otherwise on such house or other structure, and the lots on which
the same are erected, subsequently to ttle time when such labor shall have
been performed or material or machinery furnished." Held, that a me-
chanic's lien for work done between February and September, but begun in
February, has priority over a deed of trust executed in March. Dent, J.,
dissented.
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-LIABILITY FOR SERVANTS' TORTS-P6WERS
-QUILL V. MAYOR, ETC., OF CITY OF Nzw YORK, 55 N.Y. Suppl. 88.-Plain-
tiff, while attempting to board a street car, was struck and injured by a cirt
belonging to the street cleaning department of the city. The laws of New
York impose the duty upon the City of New York of removing the dirt
accumulating in the streets, and the ashes and garbage from abutting resi-
dences. Held, that such duty is quasi private, and not part of city's govern-
mental powers, and that therefore the city is liable for the torts of its ser-
vants en'gaged in the performance of such duty. This decision is contrary to
that in Davidson v. City of New York, 54 N. Y. Supp. 51; Love v. City of
Atlanta, 95 Ga. x29, and Connelly v. Mayor, etc., 46 S. W. 566 (Tenn.).
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-POWER TO TAX WITH CORPORATE LImiTS-
KAYSVILLE CITY V. ELLISON, 55 Pac. 386 (Utah).-A municipality included
within its limits a hamlet of about 4oo population, situated two miles from
city, as indicated by dwellings, etc. The population of the city itself was 70o.
The land between was farming land, and the hamlet had never been platted,
but had been created by the county commissioners a precinct with justice
of the peace and constable. No part of the revenue of the municipality was
expended on the hamlet. Held, that the municipality could not collect a
license fee from persons doing business in the hamlet
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-TORTS-PUBLIC DUTY-PoLICE-NEGLI-
GENCE-TWIST V. CITY OF ROCHESTER ET AL., 55 N. Y. Suppl. 85o.- patrol
wire maintained by a city, broke and fell across a street, killing one thereon.
Held, that the city was liable for such injury, for the defective erection of
such wire. It is immaterial that such wire was used by police department in
discharge of public duty. Woodhull v. City of New York, I5o N. Y. 45o, dis-
tinguished, as in case at bar, the police department did not itself erect wire,
but it was constructed by city, and city allowed public to use wire in carry-
ing out its duty.
PROCESS-SERVICE OF PROCESS-DEFAULT JUDGMENT-G. S. CONGDON
HARDWARE Co. v. CONSOLIDATED APEX MIN. CO., 77 N. W. IO22
(S. D.).-Process was served on a director of a corporation, who neglected
to notify the managing agents of the corporation. Judgment was taken by
default. Held, that the court's refusal to open the default after the manag-
ing agents learned of the suit, and to allow them to defend, was error.
Fuller, J., dissented.
RAILROADS-INJURIES TO EMPLOYE-NEW DEVICES-UNKNOWN DAN-
GERS-PRECAUTIONs-HEsKETT v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO., 55
N. Y. Supp. 898.-Defendant railroad company employed skilled bridge
constructor to design and take charge of erection of a new device, consisting
of a cabin raised twenty-five feet above the railroad track and supported by
iron legs imbedded in the ground. The plaintiff was in the cabin, signalling
trains, and was injured, because.of blowing over of cabin. Held (one judge
dissenting), that such cabin was a new device and that plaintiff's injuries
were received as result of a danger unknown when the device was con-
structed. Plaintiff allowed to recover. The loss must fall on employer, even
though he used every precaution which he knew was requisite, as the device
was such a new experiment as to make the employer negligent in allowing
plaintiff to use it as safe.
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RAILROADS--INJURIES TO TRESPArSSERS-EVIDENCE-DECLARATIONS OF
PERSON INJURED--BARRETT V. NEW YoRx CENT. & H. R. R. Co., 52 N. E.
Rep. 659 (N. Y.).-Plaintiff, while trespassing on defendant's freight cars,
and stealing a ride at night, was ordered off by the conductor, who then
forcibly ejected him, from which he was injured. In an action to recover
for such injuries, held, that defendant has the right to show a conversation
between plaintiff and a third person, concerning the circumstances and causes
of accident, including plaintiff's statement in such conversation as to his
object in taking the ride. Bartlett, J., dissenting.
RAiLROADs-RcEcEIvERSHIP--PRioITY OF CLAIMs-THOAS v. C. N.
0. & T. P. Ry. Co., 9i Fed. 195.-Held, that amounts shown by the books
of a railroad company to be due for labor to former employes, which had
remained unclaimed for more than six months at the time of the appoint-
ment of a receiver, and which had never been reduced to judgment, nor
established as liens under any statute, were not entitled to priority of pay-
ment, but stood on the same footing as claims of general creditors.
TAXATION OF PUBLIC PROPERTY-EXEMPTION OF PROPERTY BELONGING
TO A CITY-OWENSBORO V. COMMONWEALTH, 49 S. W. 3o (Ky.).-Constita-
tion of Kentucky, § 170, provided that "public property used for public pur-
poses" should be exempt from taxation. Held, that an engine house and
fixtures and park property were used for governmental purposes and there-
fore exempt. Guffy and White, J. J., dissented on the ground that the said
property was "nothing more or less than private property, used for the
exclusive benefit of the citizens of Owensboro," and in no sense used for
governmental purposes.
